



A Cpu-Instruction-Based Asymmetric Signing/




Follow this and additional works at: https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Technical Disclosure Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Defensive Publications
Series by an authorized administrator of Technical Disclosure Commons.
Recommended Citation
Savagaonkar, Uday and Honig, Andrew, "A Cpu-Instruction-Based Asymmetric Signing/Decryption Mechanism For Secure Handling
Of Asymmetric Keys", Technical Disclosure Commons, (September 20, 2018)
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/1521
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Technical Disclosure Common
A CPU-INSTRUCTION-BASED ASYMMETRIC SIGNING/DECRYPTION 
MECHANISM FOR SECURE HANDLING OF ASYMMETRIC KEYS 
ABSTRACT 
A method and system are disclosed for allowing a central processing unit (CPU) to 
perform signing/decryption operations securely. The system includes the CPU, which embeds an 
asymmetric private decryption key called CPU Decryption Key (CDK). A public key 
corresponding to the CDK, known as CPU Encryption Key (CEK) is published by the CPU 
vendor, and comes with a vendor-signed certificate. The CPU exposes two instructions - 
IMPORT_KEY and USE_KEY, which point to memory locations for storing decrypted keys, 
wrapped keys, and data. The disclosed mechanism provides a high level of security in cloud 
environments by providing a secure key delivery to the signer and protecting the signer. In 
addition, it involves low cost when compared to hardware security modules(HSM). 
BACKGROUND 
A data-center environment is required to handle a number of asymmetric 
signing/decryption keys. These keys include SSL signing keys, RSA decryption keys, as well as 
authentication token (e.g., OAUTH2) signing keys. Generally, in data-center environments, these 
keys are completely handled in software, making these keys vulnerable to various software as 
well as hardware attacks. An attacker that has root-level access to the computers handling the 
signing/decryption operation can easily identify these keys within the system memory by 
scraping the memory. Additionally, attackers that have physical access to computer which handle 
the signing/decryption operation can steal the keys using cold-boot or similar hardware attacks. 
An adversary possessing these keys seldom needs anything else to get access to security-
sensitive resources. Consequently, asymmetric signing/decryption keys, if compromised, can 
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pose significant security risk, as such keys are generally used as bearer credentials. Hardware 
security modules (HSMs) today provide comprehensive solution for both secure key delivery as 
well as secure signing operation. HSMs typically come with a mechanism for securely importing 
keys, and then utilizing these keys in a hardware-protected environment that is strongly protected 
against both software and hardware attacks. However, HSMs with reasonable performance are 
extremely expensive. 
DESCRIPTION 
A system and a method are disclosed for allowing a central processing unit (CPU) to 
perform signing/decryption operations securely, as illustrated in FIG. 1. The system includes the 
CPU, which embeds an asymmetric private decryption key called CPU Decryption Key (CDK). 
The CDK can be an RSA or an EC-IES private key. A public key corresponding to this CPU 
private key, known as the CPU Encryption Key (CEK) is published by the CPU vendor, and 
comes with a vendor-signed certificate. In one example, the CEK may be used to encrypt keys or 
data transmitted to the CPU by any third party entity. The CPU exposes two instruction set 
extensions - IMPORT_KEY and USE_KEY, for secure handling of keys. 
The IMPORT_KEY instruction takes two memory addresses as parameters - one memory 
address is an input and the other memory address is an output. The input/output parameters could 
also be CPU registers, instead of memory locations. The input parameter points to a memory 
location that contains the Target Asymmetric Key (TAK), which is encrypted using the CEK. 
For example, the third party entity may encrypt the TAK using the CEK and share it with the 
CPU. The TAK is the key with which a data-center operator or signer intends to perform the 
signing/decryption operation. The IMPORT_KEY instruction decrypts the encrypted TAK using 
the CDK, which is embedded in the CPU itself, and wraps it using a symmetric key called the 
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CPU Wrapping Key (CWK). This wrapped key is written to the location pointed to by the output 
memory parameter. The CWK may or may not be ephemeral, i.e., it may change from boot-to-
boot. 
 
FIG. 1: System for allowing a CPU to perform signing/decryption operations securely  
The USE_KEY instruction takes three memory addresses as parameters, wherein two 
memory addresses are input and the third memory address is an output. The first input parameter 
points to a memory location that contains the wrapped TAK, while the second memory 
parameter points to the memory location that holds the data that needs to be decrypted/signed. 
The USE_KEY instruction unwraps the wrapped TAK, signs/decrypts the data pointed to by the 
second input parameter, and writes the result to the output memory parameter, which may be 
accessed by the data-center operator or signer. Therefore, instruction set extensions 
(IMPORT_KEY and USE_KEY) provide secure delivery of keys from the third party to the 
signer. 
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Further, the multiple input memory parameters for these instructions could be coalesced 
into fewer memory parameters. For example, for the IMPORT_KEY instruction, only one 
memory parameter could be specified, and the other memory parameter could be inferred as a 
fixed offset (which could be zero) from the first memory parameter. Similarly, the memory 
parameters for the USE_KEY instruction could be coalesced into fewer instructions. 
A single CDK/CEK pair could be shared by a group of CPUs. In such a scenario, CEK 
certificate is shared by the group of CPUs. Each CPU could have a unique CDK/CEK pair, and 
comes with its own CEK certificate. The IMPORT_KEY and USE_KEY instructions could 
either be interruptible or uninterruptible instructions. 
 For instance, when the instruction is interrupted, the partial computation could be 
discarded by the CPU. Alternatively, the partial computation could be wrapped using the CWK 
(or some other key) and handed back to the software. The software can then resume the 
interrupted operation using the wrapped partial results. 
In a slight variation of this scheme, the CDK itself may not be embedded in the CPU. 
Instead, a symmetric key, called the CPU Symmetric Key (CSK) is embedded in the CPU, and 
the CDK is provided to the software wrapped with CSK. In such a scenario, the IMPORT_KEY 
instruction would first unwrap the CDK before using it to decrypt the TAK. 
The disclosed mechanism provides a high level of security in cloud environments by 
providing a secure key delivery to the signer and protecting the signer. The mechanism can be 
used to harden asymmetric keys in datacenter operations, including cloud vendors, resellers, 
CPU vendors, third party security appliances to provide higher security to their customers. 
Further, the mechanism enables IT administrators to securely deploy and utilize machine 
certificates. In addition, it involves low cost when compared to hardware security modules 
5




Savagaonkar and Honig: A Cpu-Instruction-Based Asymmetric Signing/Decryption Mechanism F
Published by Technical Disclosure Commons, 2018
